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Public Health1. Text
Globally, environmental and anthropogenic changes are impacting
ecosystems, and perturbing plant and animal demographics and behav-
iors. These changes contribute to the increasing pace of infectious dis-
ease emergence worldwide, largely driven by increasing contacts
between and among species [1,2]. Drivers of disease emergence include
mobility and trade, encroachment of natural habitats and climate
change, as well as intrinsic characteristics of pathogens, such as wide
host range for animal pathogens and the ability of plant pathogens to
hybridize [2].
The vast majority of emerging infectious diseases in humans are
zoonotic in nature [3,4]. Often, they escape their natural wildlife reser-
voirs and infect captive or domestic animals and humans upon cross-
species transmission. While the majority of zoonotic pathogens spread
limitedly among humans, occasionally some do evolve the ability to ef-
ﬁciently transmit [5]. These may cause devastating epidemics, if not
pandemics, andmay establish as novel human pathogens. Emerging in-
fectious diseases of animals likewise have typically the ability to cross
species barriers and invade new host species. In contrast, introduction
of pathogens into new geographical areas and climate change play an
essential role in the emergence of plant diseases, and the hybridization
of plant pathogens that are not naturally sympatric is repeatedly report-
ed to be involved in plant disease emergence events [2]. The conse-
quences of emerging pathogens in newly infected species, be it wild
or domestic, or in new geographical areas, can have dire repercussions
on human welfare, for example, through the disruption of ecosystem
services or from large agricultural economic losses [2,6]. As such,. Reperant).
. This is an open access article underemerging infectious diseases are One Health threats to the global
community.
Despite progress in our understanding of the mechanisms and
drivers of pathogen emergence and adaptation, infectious disease
emergence and associated health and economic burdens remain es-
sentially unpredictable. They continue to impose heavy burdens on
the global community, as most recently painfully demonstrated by
the emergence of MERS coronavirus in the Middle East and Ebola
virus in West Africa. Because the nature, time and location of the
next One Health threat cannot be forecasted, preparedness and re-
sponsiveness are essential to curb future emerging infectious disease
burdens.
Surveillance is key to preparedness by identifying and moni-
toring new threats to plant, animal and human health, and raising
early-warning ﬂags upon changing epidemiology. Major global
initiatives have profoundly revolutionized the scope of infectious
disease surveillance in plants, animals and humans. These include
the World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) Inter-
face of the OIE, the Global Animal Disease Information system
EMPRES-i of the FAO, the situation assessments and reports of
the WHO, and the internet-based Program for Monitoring Emerg-
ing Diseases (ProMED) of the International Society for Infectious
Diseases.
Using the data collected from these different sources, we present
the current status of major One Health threats. In this update, the
current status of low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus (LPAIV)
H7N9, highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the
H5 subtype, MERS coronavirus and Ebola virus are summarized.
The present report will be updated every three months, with newly
acquired data on the diseases listed above, as well as with data on
any new One Health threat that would have emerged during that
period.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1
Number of animal outbreaks and zoonotic cases of low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus
H7N9 infection from 1 January 2013 to 30 September 2015.
Country Humans Poultry Wild birds
Canada 2
China 657 554 1
Hong Kong SAR 16 2
Malaysia 1
Taiwan (Province of China) 4 1
Total 680 556 2
Fig. 1. Current status of lowpathogenic avian inﬂuenza virusH7N9 in animals and humans: A. G
from 1 January 2013 to 30 September 2015; B. Number of reported animal outbreaks and zoon
bution of animal outbreaks and zoonotic cases of infection reported from 1 April 2015 to 30 Se
Table 2
Number of reported zoonotic cases of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus H5N1 infection
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20
Azerbaijan 3
Bangladesh 1
Cambodia 5 2 1 1 1
Canada
China 1 7 14 6 3 8
Djibouti 1
Egypt 18 23 10 37
Hong Kong
Indonesia 16 59 40 21 23
Iraq 2
LPDRa 2
Myanmar 1
Nigeria 1
Pakistan 3
Thailand 17 7 3
Turkey 8
Viet Nam 3 31 68 8 5 6
West Bank
Total 4 48 103 110 85 41 75
a Lao People's Democratic Republic.
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LPAIV H7N9 was identiﬁed as a newly emerging zoonotic pathogen
in early 2013. It has caused since then a total of 680 cases of zoonotic in-
fection,with a case-fatality rate of about 20%, principally in adult and el-
derly individuals [7]. With an incubation time of 2–8 days, H7N9 virus
infection can progress from initial symptoms of high fever and other
inﬂuenza-like signs to more severe lower respiratory tract infection,lobal geographical distribution of animal outbreaks and zoonotic cases of infection reported
otic cases of infection from 1 January 2013 to 30 September 2015; C. Geographical distri-
ptember 2015.
from 1 January 2003 to 30 September 2015.
09 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
3
2 2 5
1 8 3 26 8 56
1 1
1 3 2 2 5 53
1
24 42 12 5 24 145 340
1 1
10 11 10 3 1 194
2
2
1
1
3
27
8
7 4 2 2 136
1 1
44 64 34 38 38 150 834
Table 3
Number of reported animal outbreaks and zoonotic cases of infection with highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses of the H5 subtype from 1 January 2012 to 30 September 2015.
Humans Poultry Wild birds
H5N1 H5N6 H5N1 H5N2 H5N3 H5N6 H5N8 H5N1 H5N2 H5N6 H5N8
Africa 185 1162 7
Americas 1 1 239 4 2 40 23
Asia 72 3 1395 558 26 54 534 38 2 2 34
Europe 3 13 8 6
Total 258 3 2561 804 26 54 551 48 42 2 63
3L.A. Reperant et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 1–7respiratory distress and associated complications [8]. Exposure to in-
fected poultry is considered the primary risk factor for human infec-
tion. A total of 556 outbreaks have been reported in domestic
poultry, including chickens, ducks, geese, pigeons and pheasants,
largely concurrently to zoonotic cases of infection (Table 1). A few
cases were reported in wild bird species. Because of their lowFig. 2.Diversity of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses of theH5 subtype that caused outbr
cases; B. Global geographical distribution; and C. Seasonality of H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N6 andpathogenic nature, H7N9 viruses typically cause asymptomatic or
mild infections in birds.
Most animal outbreaks and zoonotic cases of low pathogenic avian
inﬂuenza H7N9 virus infection occurred in mainland China, while
imported zoonotic cases were identiﬁed in Canada and Malaysia
(Fig. 1). The ﬁrst epidemic of H7N9 virus infection in poultry peakedeaks between 1 January 2012 and 30 September 2015: A. Number of reported outbreaks or
H5N8 virus infection.
4 L.A. Reperant et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 1–7in April 2013 soon after the ﬁrst identiﬁcation of the virus as a cause of a
zoonotic case of infection. Epidemics subsequently re-occurred in win-
ter 2014 and 2015, with the highest reported numbers of animal out-
breaks and zoonotic cases of infection during the months of January–
February of each year.
LPAIV H7N9, in contrast tomost other avian inﬂuenza viruses, can
bind to the cellular receptors used by seasonal inﬂuenza viruses [9,
10]. This ability is associated with one or two speciﬁc amino-acids
in the hemagglutinin glycoprotein. Because seasonal inﬂuenza virus-
es and LPAIV H7N9 peak coincidentally during the winter months,
they may co-infect an individual and subsequently reassort [11].
This may give rise to a transmissible variant, against which the
human population has little pre-existing immunity, and may be at
the origin of a new inﬂuenza pandemic. Strict monitoring and isola-
tion measures are therefore essential to limit the risk of seasonal in-
ﬂuenza and reassortment in individuals with zoonotic H7N9 virus
infection.Fig. 3. Current status of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses of theH5 subtype in animals a
America (A), Europe (B), Africa (D) and Asia (E) from1 January 2014 to 30 September 2015; C. G
2015 to 30 September 2015.3. Highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses of the H5 subtype
HPAIVH5N1 emerged in Hong Kong in 1997, causing 18 cases of zoo-
notic infection, including 6 fatalities [12]. After containment of the out-
break in Hong Kong, the virus re-emerged in mainland China in 2003.
It infected an unmatched diversity of wild and domestic avian andmam-
malian species, and subsequently spread over much of Asia, Europe and
Africa [13], evolving into many co-circulating antigenically-distinct
clades and lineages. The severity of the disease is highly variable across
animal species, ranging from asymptomatic infections, e.g., in dabbling
ducks [14], to severe systemic disease with high mortality rates in
other avian species aswell as inmostmammalian species found infected
[15].
Since 2003, HPAIV H5N1 has caused a total of 834 cases of zoonotic
infection in 18 countries, with a case-fatality rate of about 55% (Table 2).
As for LPAIV H7N9, exposure to infected poultry is considered the pri-
mary risk factor for human infection. However, in contrast to LPAIVnd humans: Number of reported animal outbreaks and zoonotic cases of infection inNorth
lobal distribution of reported animal outbreaks and zoonotic cases of infection from1April
Table 4
Number of reported cases ofMERS-CoV infection from1 September 2012 to 30 September
2015.
Country 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
Algeria 2 2
Austria 1 1
China 1 1
Denmark 1 1
Egypt 1 1 2
France 2 2
Germany 1 1 2
Greece 1 1
Hong Kong SAR 1 1
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 4 1 5
Italy 1 1
Jordan 1 8 6 15
Kuwait 2 1 3
Lebanon 1 1
Malaysia 1 1
Netherlands 2 2
Oman 2 4 6
Philippines 1 2 3
Qatar 1 7 2 4 14
Republic of Korea 185 185
Saudi Arabia 5 83 561 362 1011
Thailand 1 1
Tunisia 2 2
Turkey 1 1
U.K. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 3 3
United Arab Emirates 7 54 7 68
United States of America 2 2
Yemen 1 1
Total 10 110 644 574 1338
5L.A. Reperant et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 1–7H7N9 infection, more than half of the cases were identiﬁed in children
[7,16]. Unusually pathogenic, HPAIV H5N1 can present a long incuba-
tion time, ranging between 2 and 17 days. Severe signs of lower respira-
tory tract infection and extra-respiratory symptoms, such as gastro-
intestinal signs, typically rapidly supersede high fever and other
inﬂuenza-like signs and symptoms.
Since 2014, a wide diversity of reassortants containing the highly
pathogenic H5 gene emerged and caused massive outbreaks in poultry
andwild birdsworldwide. Of these reassortants, only HPAIVH5N6 is re-
ported to have caused zoonotic infections [17] (Table 3). Epidemics of
the novel HPAIVs of the H5 subtype typically peaked during the winter
and early spring months of December–March. A major exception is the
H5N2 virus that emerged and spread in poultry in North America in
2015. Although it emerged during winter, the epidemic peaked in
spring during the months of April–May (Fig. 2).
Outbreaks of HPAIVs of the H5 subtype were reported in poultry
globally, whereas cases in wild birds were more often detected and re-
ported in North America and Europe. Interestingly, the new reassortant
viruses, which are highly pathogenic in poultry, appear to cause asymp-
tomatic ormild infections inmostwild birds found infected to date [18].
Currently, zoonotic cases of H5 virus infection chieﬂy occur in Egypt,
which experienced last winter the largest H5N1 virus outbreak since its
emergence in Africa. Zoonotic cases of H5N1 virus infection are also oc-
casionally (and possibly under-) reported in South-East Asia (Fig. 3).
The expandingdiversity of HPAIVs of theH5 subtype isworrisomeas
it may increase opportunities for evolution towards a pandemic variant.
The presence of a diverse array of reassortants in wild bird populations
worldwide also indicates a major change in the epidemiology of avian
inﬂuenza viruses in their bird reservoirs. Before the emergence of
HPAIVH5N1, HPAIVswere thought to only evolve and spread in poultry
populations, where containment and stamping-out measures contrib-
uted to their eradication. The reassortant HPAIVs of the H5 subtype rep-
resent unprecedented threats to the poultry industry. As did HPAIV
H5N1, they have the potential to widely spread, if not establish, in poul-
try populations. Wild bird populations may represent a direct source of
infection for poultry, calling for strict biosecurity measures.
4. Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
MERS-CoV was ﬁrst identiﬁed as a novel zoonotic pathogen in late
2012 [19]. Since then, it has caused 1138 reported cases of zoonotic in-
fection (Table 4), with a case-fatality rate of about one-third. Infection is
characterized in severe cases by symptoms of lower respiratory tract in-
fection, respiratory distress, aswell as renal failure [20].MERS-CoVmost
likely originates from bat species, in which closely related viruses have
been detected, causing chieﬂy asymptomatic infection [21,22]. Drome-
dary camels, which develop mild respiratory tract infection with
MERS-CoV, are increasingly recognized as the main proximate source
of zoonotic infections [23,24]. Contact with infected dromedary camels
is considered the primary risk of infection in humans, while human-to-
human transmission remains rare. Nonetheless, secondary cases of
MERS are increasingly reported, mainly in hospitalized settings, often
with mild or no signs and symptoms.
Until recently, most cases of zoonotic infectionwithMERS-CoVwere
identiﬁed in theMiddle-East, while imported cases in Europe and Africa
were reported in individualswhohad recently traveled from that region
(Fig. 4). In early May 2015, a case of zoonotic MERS-CoV infection was
imported to South Korea. The hospitalization of this case initiated an
outbreak of secondary infections, causing more than 180 additional
cases in Asia (Table 4). The South Korea epidemic subsided in July
2015, while an outbreak of 130 cases was reported in Saudi Arabia in
August 2015.
The prompt characterization of the MERS-CoV as the etiological
agent of the ﬁrst reported case [19], of its cellular receptor [25], and of
its animal reservoirs [21–24] are to be commended. These are of para-
mount importance for the rapid diagnosis and containment of infectedindividuals. While the epidemiological situation has remained largely
unchanged since the emergence ofMERS, large outbreaks of nosocomial
infections are worrisome. These call for the development of speciﬁc in-
tervention strategies, should the virus become efﬁciently transmissible
among humans. Prevention at the source, for example through the vac-
cination of dromedary camels against MERS-CoV, is essential to limit
cross-species transmission of the virus from animals to humans. How-
ever, the development of speciﬁc intervention strategies to be rapidly
deployed in humans is urgently needed, and should be undertaken
ahead of a potential change in the ability of MERS-CoV to transmit
among humans. This may necessitate profound changes in the interac-
tions between the public and private sectors for the development of
new medicines, as was recently learned upon emergence of the Ebola
virus [26].
5. Ebola virus
The Ebola virus is a member of the Filoviridae, recognized as a virus
family for close to half a century [27]. It was ﬁrst identiﬁed in 1976 in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and Sudan, and con-
tinued to occasionally emerge in various regions of Africa. Until 2013,
they caused isolated and largely self-limiting outbreaks in humans, of
up to several hundred fatal cases each. The case-fatality rate of Ebola
virus infections generally ranges from 50% to 90%, depending among
other factors on the virus strain involved. Bats are believed to be the nat-
ural host reservoirs of Ebola and other ﬁloviruses, and remain largely
asymptomatic upon infection [28]. The viruses may spill over to other
animal species, which may demonstrate high mortality rates upon in-
fection. Infected animals that are hunted for bushmeat are considered
the most likely source of zoonotic Ebola virus infections in humans.
Yet, onward human-to-human transmission, via close contact with
bodily ﬂuids, contributes to the virus' further spread.
In late 2013, an unprecedented outbreak of Ebola virus infections
emerged in West Africa. The virus emerged in Guinea and spread to
Fig. 4.Current status ofMERS-CoV infection in humans: A. Global geographical distribution of zoonotic cases of infection between 1 September 2012 and30 September 2015; B. Number of
reported zoonotic cases of infection per geographical region from 1 September 2012 to 30 September 2015; C. Geographical distribution of zoonotic cases of infection that occurred
between 1 April 2015 and 30 September 2015.
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with close to 20,500 reported cases of infection (Table 5). Imported
cases of Ebola virus infection were reported in other African countries,
as well as in Europe and North America. The massive epidemic covered
a period of about a year, yet cases of infection continue to be reported inTable 5
Number of reported cases of Ebola virus infection from 1 January 2014 to 30 September
2015.
Country 2014 2015 Total
Guinea 2767 1025 3792
Liberia 4924 70 4994
Mali 8 8
Nigeria 20 20
Senegal 1 1
Sierra Leone 9514 2140 11,654
Spain 1 1
UK 1 1
USA 4 4
Total 17,239 3236 20,475Guinea in a staggering epidemic tail (Fig. 5). It remains unsure whether
new epidemic ﬂares will occur.
Early Ebola virus outbreaks proved to be largely self-limiting. The dev-
astating nature of the infection resulted in the rapid implementation of
precautionary measures at the local level, thereby interrupting chains of
human-to-human transmission after initial zoonotic events [29]. The
reasons why this apparently failed to control the recent Ebola epidemic
are unclear. However, its emergence in more uniformly and densely
inhabitedWest African regions, poverty, larger scalemovement and trav-
el, aswell as distrusting societal and behavioral responses to public health
measures, are likely to have contributed to the escape of the virus into
wider geographical areas, and to its associated exponential growth
phase [30]. No speciﬁc medical interventions, including the use of antivi-
ral drugs, antibodies or vaccines, were available at the time of the crisis, in
spite of promising data indicating avenues for their development. One of
the reasons behind the absence of speciﬁcmedical interventions is related
to “the industry paradox” based on a generally perceived absence of re-
turn on investment [26]. However, the scale of the epidemic, a trend to-
wards fast-track registration for medicines against emerging pathogens,
Fig. 5.Weekly number of reported cases of Ebola virus infection in humans from 1 January 2014 to 30 September 2015 against the geographical distribution of cases in Africa, Europe and
North America.
7L.A. Reperant et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 1–7and the advent of public–private-partnerships, openprospects for the pri-
vate sector to invest ahead of crises, with beneﬁts for the entire society.
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